Case study: Kárahnjúkar in Iceland

The Kárahnjúkar area. The glacier river Jökulsá á Dal was harnessed and a Hálsalón lagoon formed with the Kárahnjúkar dam. Another small dam was also made. The hydro plant is then producing energy, mostly for the aluminum smelter in Reyðarfjörður, for Alcoa company. Click the picture to enlarge. Vatnajökull is in the background. (Photo: Landsvirkjun). The Kárahnjúkar area. The glacier river Jökulsá á Dal was harnessed and a Hálsalón lagoon formed with the Kárahnjúkar dam. Another small dam was also made. The hydro plant is then producing energy, mostly for the aluminum smelter in Reyðarfjörður, for Alcoa company. Click the picture to enlarge. Vatnajökull is in the background. (Photo: Landsvirkjun). The Kárahnjúkar Hydroelectric Project in East-Iceland was concluded in the fall 2007. It harnesses two glacial rivers, Jökulsá á Dal and Jökulsá í Fljótsdal, originating in the Vatnajökull glacier. Installed power is 690 MW, and maximum flow is about 144 m³ per second, which ensures an annual generating capacity of about 4,600 GWst.

Kárahnjúka dam is a concrete faced rockfill dam, 700 m long and 198 m high. It is among the largest of its kind in the world, and the highest in Europe. These dams form the Hálslón reservoir, which is 57 km² and reaches the edge of Brúarjökull glacier. The water level when full is 625 m above sea level.

The total head at the project is 599 metres, and total tunnel length is 72 km. The headrace tunnels and parts of the adit tunnels are drilled with full-face boring machines, while shorter tunnels are blasted. Two 220 kV high-tension lines from the substation in Fljótsdalur run to the Alcoa aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður.


Before the project, the communities in East Iceland were experiencing a steady decline in population and local economy. Very high hopes of prosperity and employment thus existed among the local inhabitants of the area.

In 2010, the Research Centre of the University of Akureyri (RHA) published a study on the effects of the poject on the Icelandic society between 2002-2008.  Main effects as described by RHA in the report on social and economical effects are:


Population: The most effects were in the area two hours away from the main construction. The population increased from 7758 to 9445, of 1700 people or 22%, in the years 2002-2008.


Construction at Kárahnjúkar (Photo: Landsvirkjun)Construction at Kárahnjúkar (Photo: Landsvirkjun)Foreign workers: More foreign workers came to Iceland then expected. Iceland was not ready for this increase, which caused clashes between the government and the contractors on site. The contractors failed to compile with tax regulations for some time. The unemployment rate in Iceland was around 2% at the time, but 1.2% in the area close to constructions.


Economical effects: The direct economical effects of the construction of the Kárahnjúkavirkjun and the aluminum smelter of Alcoa in Reyðarfjörður were less then expected. The total cost of Kárahnjúkavirkjun was around 88 million Euros, with one third going straight to Icelandic designers, Icelandic contractors, buying material etc. The aluminum smelter cost around 80 million Euros with around 22 millions going to Icelandic parties. It’s hard to predict how much of this stayed in the eastern part of Iceland.


Kárahnjúkavirkjun: Overall social effects of the power plant are positive. People are employed and taxes paid. Jobs are also created around the plant as well as researche etc. The whole experience is also considered positive for contractors and specialists. The electricity generated is sold to Alcoa.


Alcoa: Almost 500 people were employed in the smelter in December 2009. Jobs around the smelter are around 300.  Alcoa buys the energy, employee’s people and also works for the community with grants and other acts.


The east of Iceland went into a boom with the Kárahnjúkar project (Photo: Halldór Jóhannsson - Arctic Portal)The east of Iceland went into a boom with the Kárahnjúkar project (Photo: Halldór Jóhannsson - Arctic Portal)Other: Jobs in the east increased and salaries raised, the local business made bigger profits and local infrastructures strengthened. Tourism also increased.


Main problems: Housing was a big problem for the east of Iceland. Around 135 thousand m2 were built in the east until the end of 2008. The need was thought to be 70-80 thousand m2. The price of houses grew a lot but mostly went down after the construction. In October 2009, a total of 218 apartments were empty. Most of them were in apartment buildings with numerous flats. This is typical for a "ghost town".

 

The region's population and economy had been in relative decline for decades with only a limited diversity of jobs available and a continuing dependence on the primary sector which had been rationalised and thus required a declining amount of manpower. The age and sex distribution showed signs of lengthy out-migration, primarily to the Reykjavík area, with relatively few young adults and women remaining.


Local inhabitants of the area had high hopes of prosperity and employment when the project was launched. Environmental concerns were raised, mainly by environmental groups from outside the region. An environmental impact assessment (EIA) was performed and construction was started. During the construction period, the region witnessed a significant increase in activity and investment in the projects, as well as in the housing sector and in other aspects of infrastructure. Shifts in employment have been observed, with a marked decline in fish processing jobs.


Sources: Megaprojects in the Circumpolar North Kárahnjúkar website RHA

Case study: Tumbler Ridge

A chimney blowing black smoke (Photo: GettyImages)A chimney blowing black smoke (Photo: GettyImages)The establishment of the town of Tumbler Ridge is an example of a town dependent on a single resource industry. In the mid-1970s, spurred on by Japanese demands for coal energy to fire their steel mills, the British-Columbian provincial government engaged in the Northeast Coal Project (NECP).

 

It was a megaproject that aimed to develop coal-mining operations in the northeast interior of British Columbia.

 

In this way, the British-Columbian government introduced industrial development to the region, which would include not just coal mining, but also the development of the infrastructure needed to transport the coal to a Pacific port.

The British-Columbian government invested in this megaproject with the hope of coal prices rising to $100 per tonne by the end of the century.

 

These hopes were dashed, however: by the early 1980s, the global economy was in recession and the demand for steel declined. As a result, the demand for coal declined and so did coal prices.


The Canadian government spent over $1 billion on the Northeast coal project to create jobs. Critics noted that by creating only 1,000 jobs, each job cost taxpayers $1 million.


The coal project ultimately failed.

 

Source: UArctic

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